Self-stabilization is a versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed systems that permits to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors. Combining these two properties proved difficult: it is impossible to contain the spatial impact of Byzantine nodes in a self-stabilizing context for global tasks such as tree orientation and tree construction.
Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [5, 7, 15] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults, while Byzantine Fault-tolerance [10] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is appealing yet proved difficult [8, 3, 13] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Two main paths have been followed to study the impact of Byzantine faults in the context of selfstabilization:
1. Byzantine fault masking. In completely connected synchronous systems, one of the most studied problems in the context of self-stabilization with Byzantine faults is that of clock synchronization. In [1, 8] , probabilistic self-stabilizing protocols were proposed for up to one third of Byzantine processors, while in [6, 9] deterministic solutions tolerate up to one fourth and one third of Byzantine processors, respectively.
2. Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was proposed [13, 14, 12] . Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside which the effect of permanent faults is masked, provided that the problem specification makes it possible to break the causality chain that is caused by the faults. As many problems are not local, it turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those.
Our Contribution In this paper, we investigate the possibility of Byzantine containment in a selfstabilizing setting for tasks that are global (i.e. for with there exists a causality chain of size r, where r depends on n the size of the network), and focus on two global problems, namely tree orientation and tree construction. As strict stabilization is impossible with such global tasks, we weaken the containment constraint by limiting the number of times that correct processes can be disturbed by Byzantine ones. Remind that strict stabilization requires that processes beyond the containment radius eventually achieve their desired behavior and are never disturbed by Byzantine processes afterwards. We relax this requirement in the following sense: we allow these correct processes beyond the containment radius to be disturbed by Byzantine processes, but only a limited number of times, even if Byzantine nodes take an infinite number of actions.
The main contribution of this paper is to present new possibility results for containing the influence of unbounded Byzantine behaviors. In more details, we define the notion of strong stabilization as the novel form of the containment and introduce disruption times to quantify the quality of the containment. The notion of strong stabilization is weaker than the strict stabilization but is stronger than the classical notion of self-stabilization (i.e. every strongly stabilizing protocol is self-stabilizing, but not necessarily strictly stabilizing). While strict stabilization aims at tolerating an unbounded number of Byzantine processes, we explicitly refer the number of Byzantine processes to be tolerated. A self-stabilizing protocol is (t, c, f )-strongly stabilizing if the subsystem consisting of processes more than c hops away from any Byzantine process is disturbed at most t times in a distributed system with at most f Byzantine processes. Here c denotes the containment radius and t denotes the disruption time.
To demonstrate the possibility and effectiveness of our notion of strong stabilization, we consider tree orientation and tree construction. It is shown in [13] that there exists no strictly stabilizing protocol with a constant containment radius for these problems. The impossibility result can be extended even when the number of Byzantine processes is upper bounded (by one). In this paper, we first show that the problem of tree orientation has no constant bound for the containment radius in a tree with two Byzantine processes even when we allow processes beyond the containment radius to be disturbed a finite number of times. Then we consider the case of a single Byzantine process and present a (∆, 0, 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for tree orientation, where ∆ is the maximum degree of processes. The containment radius of 0 is obviously optimal. Also, we provide a (f ∆ d , 0, f )-strongly stabilizing protocol for rooted tree construction, provided that correct processes remain connected, where n (respectively f ) is the number of processes (respectively Byzantine processes) and d is the diameter of the subsystem consisting of all correct processes. Notice that each process does not need to know the number f of Byzantine processes and that f can be n − 1 at the worst case. In other words, the algorithm is adaptive in the sense that the disruption times depend on the actual number of Byzantine processes. The containment radius of 0 is also optimal. Both algorithms are also optimal with respect to the number of tolerated Byzantine nodes.
Preliminaries

Distributed System
is called an output register of u and is called an input register of v. The set of all output (resp. input) registers of u is denoted by Out u (resp. In u ), i.e. Out u = {r u,v | v ∈ N u } and In u = {r v,u |v ∈ N u }.
The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. Similarly, the values of the variables stored in each link register denote the state of the registers. A process may take actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an atomic manner by the process. The actions executed by each process is described by a finite set of guarded actions of the form guard −→ statement . Each guard of process u is a boolean expression involving the variables of u and its input registers. Each statement of process u is an update of its state only.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product of states of all processes and all link registers. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed system S. For a process set R ⊆ P and two configurations ρ and ρ ′ , we denote ρ R → ρ ′ when ρ changes to ρ ′ by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that ρ and ρ ′ can be different only in the states of processes in R and the states of their output registers. For completeness of execution semantics, we should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring processes. The action of a process depends only on its state at ρ and the states of its input registers at ρ, and the result of the action reflects on the states of the process and its output registers at ρ ′ . A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q = R 1 , R 2 , . . . be a schedule, where R i ⊆ P holds for each i (i ≥ 1). An infinite sequence of configurations e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . .
is called an execution from an initial configuration ρ 0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies ρ i−1
. Process actions are executed atomically, and we also assume that a distributed daemon schedules the actions of processes, i.e. any subset of processes can simultaneously execute their actions.
The set of all possible executions from ρ 0 ∈ C is denoted by E ρ0 . The set of all possible executions is denoted by E, that is, E = ρ∈C E ρ . We consider asynchronous distributed systems where we can make no assumption on schedules except that any schedule is weakly fair : every process is contained in infinite number of subsets appearing in any schedule.
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine process (i.e. a Byzantine-faulty process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine process, v can repeatedly change its variables and its output registers arbitrarily.
In asynchronous distributed systems, time is usually measured by asynchronous rounds (simply called rounds). Let e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . be an execution by a schedule Q = R 1 , R 2 , . . .. The first round of e is defined to be the minimum prefix of e, e ′ = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . , ρ k , such that k i=1 R i = P ′ where P ′ is the set of correct processes of P . Round t (t ≥ 2) is defined recursively, by applying the above definition of the first round to e ′′ = ρ k , ρ k+1 , . . .. Intuitively, every correct process has a chance to update its state in every round.
Self-Stabilizing Protocol Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper is so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem, while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification predicate (shortly, specification), spec(v), for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with a solution) if every process satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on variables of P v (⊆ P ) where P v is the set of processes whose variables appear in spec(v). The variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (shortly, O-variables) . In what follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification spec(v).
A self-stabilizing protocol is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration, where spec(v) holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a legitimate configuration, every process v never changes its O-variables and always satisfies spec(v). From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every process correctly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently faulty processes.
When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not satisfy spec(v). In addition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and may be unable to satisfy spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [13] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a self-stabilizing protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows. The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [13] . The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [13] dealt with unbounded number of Byzantine faults (that is f ∈ {0 . . . n}).
Definition 3 ((c, f )-strict stabilization) A protocol is (c, f )-strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . contains a configuration ρ i that is (c, f )-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [13] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. Intuitively, a specification is r-restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two processes u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine tolerance is that the containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For some problems, such as the spanning tree construction we consider in this paper, r can not be bounded to a constant. We can show that there exists no (o(n), 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for the spanning tree construction.
To circumvent the impossibility result, we define a weaker notion than the strict stabilization. Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. there may exist processes outside the containment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to Byzantine actions. However, the impact of Byzantine triggered action is limited in times: the set of Byzantine processes may only impact the subsystem consisting of processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
From the states of c-correct processes, c-legitimate configurations and c-stable configurations are defined as follows. Roughly speaking, the aim of self-stabilization is to guarantee that a distributed system eventually reaches a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. However, a self-stabilizing system can be disturbed by Byzantine processes after reaching a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. The c-disruption represents the period where c-correct processes are disturbed by Byzantine processes and is defined as follows Note that a (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration is a (c, f )-contained configuration when t = k = 0, and thus, (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration is a generalization (relaxation) of a (c, f )-contained configuration. Thus, a strongly stabilizing protocol is weaker than a strictly stabilizing one (as processes outside the containment radius may take incorrect actions due to Byzantine influence). However, a strongly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing one (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameters t, k and c are introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each process to know the values of the parameters. Actually, the protocols proposed in this paper assume no knowledge on the parameters.
There exists some relationship between these parameters as the following proposition states:
Proof Let ρ 0 be a (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration for spec. Assume that t > nk.
If there exists no execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . such that e contains at least nk + 1 c-disruptions, then ρ 0 is in fact a (nk, k, c, f )-time contained configuration for spec (and hence, we have t ≤ nk). This is contradictory. So, there exists an execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . such that e contains at least nk + 1 cdisruptions.
As any c-disruption contains at least one action of a c-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable by definition, we obtain that e contains at least nk + 1 actions of c-correct processes for changing the values of O-variables. There is at most n c-correct processes. So, there exists at least one c-correct process which takes at least k + 1 actions for changing the value of O-variables in e. This is contradictory with the fact that ρ 0 is a (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration for spec.
Discussion
There exists an analogy between the respective powers of (c, f )-strict stabilization and (t, k, c, f )-strong stabilization for the one hand, and self-stabilization and pseudo-stabilization for the other hand.
A pseudo-stabilizing protocol (defined in [2] ) guarantees that every execution has a suffix that matches the specification, but it could never reach a legitimate configuration from which any possible execution matches the specification. In other words, a pseudo-stabilizing protocol can continue to behave satisfying the specification, but with having possibility of invalidating the specification in future. A particular schedule can prevent a pseudo-stabilizing protocol from reaching a legitimate configuration for arbitrarily long time, but cannot prevent it from executing its desired behavior for arbitrarily long time. Thus, a pseudo-stabilizing protocol is useful since desired behavior is eventually reached.
Similarly, every execution of a (t, k, c, f )-strongly stabilizing protocol has a suffix such that every c-correct process executes its desired behavior. But (t, k, c, f )-strongly stabilizing protocol could never reach a configuration after which Byzantine processes cannot disturb the c-correct processes: all the c-correct processes can continue to execute their desired behavior, but with having possibility that the system (resp. each process) could be disturbed at most t (resp. k) times by Byzantine processes in future. A notable but subtle difference is that the invalidation of the specification is caused only by the effect of Byzantine processes in a (t, k, c, f )-strongly stabilizing protocol, while the invalidation can be caused by a scheduler in a pseudo-stabilizing protocol.
3 Strongly-Stabilizing Tree Orientation
Problem definition
In this section, we consider only tree systems, i.e. distributed systems containing no cycles. We assume that all processes in a tree system are identical and thus no process is distinguished as a root.
Informally, tree orientation consists in transforming a tree system (with no root) into a rooted tree system. Each process v has an O-variable prnt v to designate a neighbor as its parent. Since processes have no identifiers, prnt v actually stores k (∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∆ v }) to designate its k-th neighbor as its parent. But for simplicity, we use prnt v = k and prnt v = u (where u is the k-th neighbor of v) interchangeably.
The goal of tree orientation is to set prnt v of every process v to form a rooted tree. However, it is impossible to choose a single process as the root because of impossibility of symmetry breaking. Thus, instead of a single root process, a single root link is determined as the root: link (u, v) is the root link when processes u and v designate each other as their parents ( Fig. 1(a) ). From any process w, the root link can be reached by following the neighbors designated by the variables prnt.
When a tree system S has a Byzantine process (say w), w can prevent communication between subtrees of S − {w} 1 . Thus, we have to allow each of the subtrees to form a rooted tree independently. We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the tree orientation as follows. Figure 1 shows examples of 0-legitimate configurations (a) with no Byzantine process and (b) with a single Byzantine process w. The arrow attached to each process points the neighbor designated as its parent. Notice that, from Fig. 1(b) , subtrees consisting of correct processes are classified into two categories: one is the case of forming a rooted tree with a root link in the subtree (T 1 in Fig. 1(b) ), and the other is the case of forming a rooted tree with a root process, where the root process is a neighbor of a Byzantine process and designates the Byzantine process as its parent (T 2 in Fig. 1(b) ).
Impossibility for two Byzantine processes
Tree orientation seems to be a very simple task. Actually, for tree orientation in fault-free systems, we can design a self-stabilizing protocol that chooses a link incident to a center process 2 as the root link: in case that the system has a single center, the center can choose a link incident to it, and in case that the system has two neighboring centers, the link between the centers become the root link. However, tree orientation becomes impossible if we have Byzantine processes. By the impossibility results of [13] , we can show that tree orientation has no (o(n), 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol; i.e. the Byzantine influence cannot be contained in the sense of "strict stabilization", even if only a single Byzantine process is allowed.
An interesting question is whether the Byzantine influence can be contained in a weaker sense of "strong stabilization". The following theorem gives a negative answer to the question: if we have two Byzantine processes, bounding the number of disruptions is impossible. We prove the impossibility for more restricted schedules, called the central daemon, which disallows two or more processes to make actions at the same time. Notice that impossibility results under the central daemon are stronger than those under the distributed daemon in the sense that impossibility results under the central daemon also hold for the distributed daemon.
Theorem 1 Even under the central daemon, there exists no deterministic (t, o(n), 2)-strongly stabilizing protocol for tree orientation where t is any (finite) integer and n is the number of processes.
Proof Let S = (P, L) be a chain (or a special case of a tree system) of n processes:
For purpose of contradiction, assume that there exists a (t, o(n), 2)-strongly stabilizing protocol A for some integer t. In the following, we show, for S with Byzantine processes v 1 and v n , that A has an execution e containing an infinite number of o(n)-disruptions. This contradicts the assumption that A is a (t, o(n), 2)-strongly stabilizing protocol.
In S with Byzantine processes v 1 and v n , A eventually reaches a configuration ρ 1 that is o(n)-legitimate for spec and o(n)-stable. This execution to ρ 1 constitutes the prefix of e.
To construct e after ρ 1 , consider another chain
of 3n processes and an execution of
We consider the initial configuration ρ (Fig. 2) . Letting w be a center process of S (i.e. w = v ⌈n/2⌉ ), w is copied to w By repeating the argument, we can construct the execution e of A on S that contains an infinite number of o(n)-disruptions.
3.3 A strongly stabilizing protocol for a single Byzantine process
Protocol ss-T O
In the previous subsection, we proved that there is no strongly stabilizing protocol for tree orientation if two Byzantine processes exist. In this subsection, we consider the case with at most a single Byzantine process, and present a (∆, 0, 1)-strongly stabilizing tree orientation protocol ss-T O. Note that we consider the distributed daemon for this possibility result. In a fault-free tree system, tree orientation can be easily achieved by finding a center process. A simple strategy for finding the center process is that each process v informs each neighbor u of the maximum distance to a leaf from u through v. The distances are found and become fixed from smaller ones. When a tree system contains a single Byzantine process, however, this strategy cannot prevent perturbation caused by wrong distances the Byzantine process provides: by reporting longer and shorter distances than the correct one alternatively, the Byzantine process can repeatedly pull the chosen center closer and push it farther.
The key idea of protocol ss-T O to circumvent the perturbation is to restrict the Byzantine influence to one-sided effect: the Byzantine process can pull the chosen root link closer but cannot push it farther. This can be achieved using a non-decreasing variable level v as follows: when a process v finds a neighbor u with a higher level, u chooses v as its parent and copies the level value from u. This allows the Byzantine process (say z) to make its neighbors choose z as their parents by increasing its own level. However, z can not make neighbor change their parents to other processes by decreasing its own level. Thus, the effect the Byzantine process can make is one-sided.
Protocol ss-T O is presented in Fig. 3 . For simplicity, we regard constant N v as denoting the neighbors of v and regard variable prnt v as storing a parent of v. Notice that they should be actually implemented using the ordinal numbers of neighbors that v locally assigns.
Legitimate Configurations of ss-T O
We refine legitimate configurations of protocol ss-T O and show their properties. We cannot make any assumption on the initial values of register variables. But once a correct process v executes its action, In any legitimate configuration in LC0, variables prnt v of all processes form a rooted tree with a root link as Fig. 1(a) , and all variables level v have the same value.
Lemma 1 In a fault-free tree, once protocol ss-T O reaches a configuration ρ in LC0, it remains at ρ.
Proof Consider any configuration ρ in LC0. Since all variables level v have the same value, the guard of GA1 cannot be true in ρ. Since spec(v) holds at every process in ρ, there exist no neighboring processes u and v such that prnt u = v and prnt v = u holds. It follows that the guard of GA2 cannot be true in ρ. Once each process executes an action, all the variables of its output registers are consistent with its local variables, and thus, the guard of GA3 cannot be true.
For the case with a single Byzantine process, legitimate configurations are refined as follows.
Definition 10 (0-legitimate configurations LC1) Let z be the single Byzantine process in a tree system. A configuration is 0-legitimate if every subtree (or a connected component) of S-{z} satisfies either the following (C1) or (C2). (C1) (a) spec(u) holds for every correct process u, (b) prnt v = z holds for the neighbor v of z, and (c)
level w ≥ level x holds for any neighboring correct processes w and x where w is nearer than x to z.
(C2) (d) spec(u) holds for every correct process u, and (e) level v = level w holds for any correct processes v and w.
The set of all 0-legitimate configurations for a single Byzantine process is denoted by LC1.
When every subtree of S-{z} satisfies (C1), the configuration is said to be strictly 0-legitimate.
In a strictly 0-legitimate configuration, every subtree forms the rooted tree with the root process neighboring the Byzantine process z. For strictly 0-legitimate configurations, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2 Once protocol ss-T O reaches a strictly 0-legitimate configuration ρ, it remains in strictly 0-legitimate ones and, thus, no correct process u changes prnt u afterward. That is, any strictly 0-legitimate configuration is (0, 1)-contained.
Proof Consider any execution e starting from a strictly 0-legitimate configuration ρ. In ρ, every subtree of S − {z} forms the rooted tree with the root process neighboring the Byzantine process z. As long as no correct process u changes prnt u in e, action GA2 cannot be executed at any correct process. On the other hand, level prntu ≥ level u necessarily holds immediately after u executes action GA1. Thus, we can see that every configuration of e is strictly 0-legitimate, if no correct process u changes prnt u in e (by execution of GA1). In the following, we show that any correct process u never changes prnt u in e.
For contradiction, assume that a correct process u changes prnt u first among all correct processes. Notice that every correct process v can execute GA1 or GA3 but cannot change prnt v before u changes prnt u . Also notice that u changes prnt u to its neighbor (say w) by execution of GA1 and w is a correct process. From the guard of GA1, level w > level u holds immediately before u changes prnt u . On the other hand, since w is a correct process, w never changes prnt w before u. This implies that prnt w = u holds immediately before u changes prnt u , and thus level u ≥ level w holds. This is a contradiction.
Notice that a correct process u may change level u by execution of GA1 even after a strictly 0-legitimate configuration. When the Byzantine process z increments level z infinitely often, every process u may also increment level u infinitely often.
Lemma 3 Any configuration ρ in LC1 is (∆ z , 1, 0, 1)-time contained where z is the Byzantine process.
Proof Consider any execution e starting from ρ. By the same discussion as the proof of Lemma 2, we can show that any subtree satisfying (C1) at ρ always keeps satisfying the condition and no correct process u in the subtree changes prnt u afterward.
Consider a subtree satisfying (C2) at ρ and let y be the neighbor of the Byzantine process z in the subtree. From the fact that variables prnt u form a rooted tree with a root link and all variables level u have the same value in the subtree at ρ, no process u in the subtree changes prnt u or level u unless y executes prnt y := z in e. When prnt y := z is executed, level y becomes larger than level u of any other process u in the subtree. Since the value of variable level u of each correct process u is non-decreasing, every correct neighbor (say v) of y eventually executes prnt v := y and level v := level y (by GA1). By repeating the argument, we can show that the subtree eventually reaches a configuration satisfying (C1) in O(d ′ ) rounds where d ′ is the diameter of the subtree. It is clear that any configuration before reaching the first configuration satisfying (C1) is not 0-legitimate, and that each process u changes prnt u at most once during the execution.
Therefore, any execution e starting from ρ contains at most ∆ z 0-disruptions where each correct process u changes prnt u at most once.
Convergence of ss-T O
We first show convergence of protocol ss-T O to legitimate configurations in a fault-free case.
Lemma 4 In a fault-free tree system, protocol ss-T O eventually reaches a legitimate configuration of LC0 from any initial configuration.
Proof We prove the convergence to a legitimate configuration by induction on the number of processes n. It is clear that protocol ss-T O reaches a legitimate configuration of LC0 from any initial configuration in case of n = 2. Now assume that protocol ss-T O reaches a legitimate configuration of LC0 from any initial configuration in case that the number of processes is n − 1 (inductive hypothesis), and consider the case that the number of processes is n.
Let u be any leaf process and v be its only neighbor. After v executes its action, level v ≥ level u holds. Process u can execute only guarded action GA1 or GA3 since prnt u = v always holds. Thus, after the first round completes, prnt u = v and level v ≥ level u always hold. It follows that v never executes prnt v := u in the second round and later. This implies that, after some configuration ρ, (a) prnt v = u always holds, or (b) prnt v = u always holds.
In case (a), the behavior of v after ρ is never influenced by u: v behaves exactly the same even when u does not exist. From the inductive hypothesis, protocol ss-T O eventually reaches a configuration ρ ′ such that S − {u} satisfies the condition of LC0 and remains in ρ ′ afterward (from Lemma 1). After u executes its action at ρ ′ , level u = level v holds and thus the configuration of S is in LC0. Now consider case (b), where we do not use the inductive hypothesis. The fact that prnt v = u (and prnt u = v) always holds implies that level v (and also level u ) remains unchanged. From the fact that prnt v = u always holds and level v remains unchanged, it follows for any neighbor w ( = u) that either (i) level w < level v or (ii) level w = level v and prnt w = v always holds; otherwise v changes prnt v . But the case (i) is impossible to keep since the action of w changes level w so that level w ≥ level v holds. Thus, the case (ii) always holds. This implies that the fragment of S consisting of processes within distance two from u reaches a configuration satisfying the condition of LC0 and remains unchanged. By repeating the argument, we can show that ss-T O eventually reaches a legitimate configuration in LC0 where link (u, v) is the root link.
Consequently, protocol ss-T O reaches a legitimate configuration of LC0 from any initial configuration. Now, we consider the case with a single Byzantine process.
Lemma 5 In a tree system with a single Byzantine process, protocol ss-T O eventually reaches a 0-legitimate configuration of LC1 from any initial configuration.
Proof Let z be the Byzantine process, S ′ be any subtree (or a connected component) of S − {z} and y be the process in S ′ neighboring z (in S). We prove, by induction on the number of processes n ′ of S ′ , that S ′ eventually reaches a configuration satisfying the condition (C1) or (C2) of Definition 10.
It is clear that S ′ reaches a configuration satisfying (C1) from any initial configuration in case of n ′ = 1. Now assume that S ′ reaches a configuration satisfying (C1) or (C2) from any initial configuration in case of n ′ = k − 1 (inductive hypothesis), and consider the case of n ′ = k (≥ 2). From n ′ ≥ 2, there exists a leaf process u in S ′ that is not neighboring the Byzantine process z. Let v be the neighbor of u. Since processes u and v are correct processes, we can show the following by the same argument as the fault-free case (Lemma 4): After some configuration ρ, (a) prnt v = u always holds, or (b) prnt v = u always holds. In case (a), we can show from the inductive hypothesis that S ′ eventually reaches a configuration satisfying (C1) or (C2). In case (b), we can show that S ′ eventually reaches a configuration satisfying (C2) where link (u, v) is the root link.
Consequently, protocol ss-T O reaches a 0-legitimate configuration of LC1 from any initial configuration.
The following main theorem is obtained from Lemmas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Theorem 2 Protocol ss-T O is a (∆, 0, 1)-strongly stabilizing tree-orientation protocol.
Round complexity of ss-T O
In this subsection, we focus on the round complexity of ss-T O. First, we show the following lemma. Proof We prove the lemma by induction on h(v, u).
First consider the case of h(v, u) = 1, where u is a leaf process. When the first round completes, all the output registers of every process becomes consistent with the process variables. Since u is a leaf process, prnt u = v always holds. It follows that process v can execute prnt v := u only in GA1. Once v executes its action in the second round, level v ≥ level u holds and prnt v := u of GA1 cannot be executed afterward. Thus, prnt v := u of GA1 can be executed only in the first and second rounds. It is clear that in round 3 or later, level v remains unchanged as long as prnt v = u holds.
We assume that the lemma holds when h(v, u) ≤ k − 1 (inductive hypothesis) and consider the case of h(v, u) = k. We assume that prnt v := u of GA1 or GA2 is executed in round r, and show that r ≤ 2k holds in the following. Variable level v is also incremented in the action, and let ℓ be the resultant value of level v . In the following, we consider two cases.
• Case that prnt v := u of GA1 is executed in round r: When prnt v := u is executed, level u = ℓ holds.
But level u < ℓ holds when v executes its action in round r − 1; otherwise, v reaches a state with level v ≥ ℓ in round r − 1 and cannot execute prnt v := u (with level v := ℓ) in round r. This implies that u incremented level u to ℓ in round r − 1 or r.
In the case that u makes the increment of level u by GA1, u executes prnt u := w for w ( = v) in the same action. Since h(u, w) < h(v, u) holds, the action is executed in the first 2h(u, w) rounds from the inductive hypothesis. Consequently, prnt v := u of GA1 is executed in round 2h(u, w) + 1 (< 2h(v, u)) at latest.
In the case that u makes the increment of level u by GA2, u executes prnt u := w for some w (∈ N u ) in the same action, where w = v may hold. For the case of w = v, we can show, by the similar argument to the above, that prnt v := u is executed in round 2h(u, w) + 1 (< 2h(v, u)) at latest. Now consider the case of w = v. Then level v = level u = ℓ − 1, prnt v = u and prnt u = v hold immediately before u executes prnt u := v and level u := ℓ. Between the actions of level u := ℓ − 1 (with prnt u := w (w = v)) and level u := ℓ (with prnt u := v), v can execute its action at most once; otherwise, level v ≥ ℓ − 1 holds after the first action, and level v ≥ ℓ or prnt v = u holds after the second action. This implies that level u := ℓ − 1 with prnt u := w (w = v) is executed in the previous or the same round as the action of level u := ℓ, and thus, in round r − 2 or later. Since h(u, w) < h(v, u) holds, the action is executed in the first 2h(u, w) rounds from the inductive hypothesis. Consequently, prnt v := u of GA1 is executed in round 2h(u, w) + 2 (≤ 2h(v, u)) at latest.
• Case that prnt v := u is executed in GA2: Then level v = level u = ℓ−1, prnt v = u and prnt u = v hold immediately before v executes prnt v := u and level v := ℓ. Between the executions of level v := ℓ − 1 and level v := ℓ, u can execute its action at most once, and u executes prnt u := w for some w ( = v) in the action. Since h(u, w) < h(v, u) holds, this action is executed in the first 2h(u, w) rounds from the inductive hypothesis. Consequently, prnt v := u is executed in round 2h(u, w) + 1 (< 2h(v, u)).
It remains to show that level v remains unchanged in round 2h(v, u)+1 or later, as long as prnt v = u holds. Now assume that prnt v = u holds at the end of round 2h(v, u).
• Case that prnt u = v holds at the end of round 2h(v, u): Since h(u, w) < h(v, u) for any w ∈ N u − {v}, prnt u := w cannot be executed in round 2h(v, u) + 1 or later from the inductive hypothesis, and so prnt u = v holds afterward. Thus, it is clear that level v remains unchanged as long as prnt v = u (and prnt u = v) holds.
• Case that prnt u = v holds at the end of round 2h(v, u): Let prnt u = w hold for some w ∈ N u − {v} at the end of round 2h(v, u). Since h(u, w) < h(v, u), level u remains unchanged as long as prnt u = w holds from the inductive hypothesis. It follows that level v remains unchanged as long as prnt v = u and prnt u = w hold. Since h(u, x) < h(v, u) for any x ∈ N u − {v}, prnt u := x cannot be executed in round 2h(v, u) + 1 or later, but prnt u := v can be executed. Immediately after execution of prnt u := v, level v = level u holds if prnt v remains unchanged. Thus, it is clear that level v remains unchanged as long as prnt v = u (and prnt u = v) holds.
The following lemma holds for the fault-free case.
Lemma 7 In a fault-free tree system, protocol ss-T O reaches a legitimate configuration of LC0 from any initial configuration in O(d) rounds where d is the diameter of the tree system S.
Proof Lemma 6 implies that, after round 2d + 1 or later, no process v changes prnt v or level v and thus the configuration remains unchanged. Lemma 4 guarantees that the final configuration is a legitimate configuration in LC0.
For the single-Byzantine case, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 8
In a tree system with a single Byzantine process, protocol ss-T O reaches a 0-legitimate configuration of LC1 from any initial configuration in O(n) rounds.
Proof Let z be the Byzantine process and S ′ be any subtree of S − {z}. Let v be the neighbor of z in S ′ . From Lemma 6, v cannot execute prnt v := w for any w ∈ N v − {z} in round 2d ′ + 1 or later, where d ′ is the diameter of S ′ . We consider the following two cases depending on prnt v .
• Case that prnt v = w for some w ∈ N v − {z} at the end of round 2d ′ and prnt v remains unchanged during the following d ′ rounds (from round 2d ′ + 1 to round 3d ′ ): From Lemma 6, level v also remains unchanged during the d ′ rounds. By the similar discussion to that in proof of Lemma 6, we can show that S ′ reaches a configuration satisfying the condition (C2) of Definition 10 by the end of round 3d
′ .
• Case that prnt v = z holds at the end of round 2d ′ or in some configuration during the following d ′ rounds (from round 2d ′ + 1 to round 3d ′ ): Let c be the configuration where prnt v = z holds. From Lemma 6, prnt v = z always holds after c. We can show, by induction of k that, a fraction of S ′ consisting of processes with distance up to k from v satisfies the condition (C1) at the end of k rounds after c. Thus, S ′ reaches a configuration satisfying the condition (C1) of Definition 10 by the end of round 4d ′ .
After a subtree reaches a configuration satisfying the condition (C2), its configuration may change into one satisfying the condition (C1) and the configuration may not satisfy (C1) or (C2) during the transition. However, Lemma 3 guarantees that the length of the period during the subtree does not satisfy (C1) or (C2) is O(d ′ ) rounds, where d ′ is the diameter of the subtree. Since the total of diameters of all the subtrees in S − {z} is O(n), the convergence to a 0-legitimate configuration satisfying (C1) or (C2) can be delayed at most O(n) rounds.
Finally, we can show the following theorem. For spanning tree construction, each process v has an O-variable prnt v to designate a neighbor as its parent. Since processes have no identifiers, prnt v actually stores k (∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∆ v }) to designate its k-th neighbor as its parent. No neighbor is designated as the parent of v when prnt v = 0 holds. For simplicity, we use prnt v = k (∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∆ v }) and prnt v = u (where u is the k-th neighbor of v N v (k)) interchangeably, and prnt v = 0 and prnt v = ⊥ interchangeably.
The goal of spanning tree construction is to set prnt v of every process v to form a rooted spanning tree, where prnt r = 0 should hold for the root process r.
We consider Byzantine processes that can behave arbitrarily. The faulty processes can behave as if they were any internal processes of the spanning tree, or even as if they were the root processes. The first restriction we make on Byzantine processes is that we assume the root process r can start from an arbitrary state, but behaves correctly according to a protocol. Another restriction on Byzantine processes is that we assume that all the correct processes form a connected subsystem; Byzantine processes never partition the system.
It is impossible, for example, to distinguish the (real) root r from the faulty processes behaving as the root, we have to allow that a spanning forest (consisting of multiple trees) is constructed, where each tree is rooted with a root, correct or faulty one.
We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the tree construction as follows.
Notice that spec(v) requires that a spanning tree is constructed at any 0-legitimate configuration, when no Byzantine process exists. Figure 4 shows an example of 0-legitimate configuration with Byzantine processes. The arrow attached to each process points the neighbor designated as its parent.
Protocol ss-ST
In many self-stabilizing tree construction protocols, each process checks locally the consistence of its level variable with respect to the one of its neighbors. When it detects an inconsistency, it changes its prnt variable in order to choose a "better" neighbor. The notion of "better" neighbor is based on the global desired property on the tree (e.g. BFS, DFS...).
When the system may contain Byzantine processes, they may disturb their neighbors by providing alternatively "better" and "worse" states.
The key idea of protocol ss-ST to circumvent this kind of perturbation is the following: when a correct process detects a local inconsistency, it does not choose a "better" neighbor but it chooses another neighbor according to a round robin order (along the set of its neighbor). Figure 5 presents our strongly-stabilizing spanning tree construction protocol ss-ST that can tolerate any number of Byzantine processes other than the root process (providing that the subset of correct processes remains connected).
Proof of strong stabilization of ss-ST
We cannot make any assumption on the initial values of register variables. But, we can observe that if an output register of a correct process has inconsistent values with the process variables then this process is enabled by a rule of ss-ST . By fairness assumption, any such process takes a step in a finite time.
Once a correct process v executes one of its action, variables of its output registers have values consistent with the process variables: r-prnt v,prntv = true, r-prnt v,w = f alse (w ∈ N v − {prnt v }), and r-level v,w = level v (w ∈ N v ) hold.
Consequently, we can assume in the following that all the variables of output registers of every correct process have consistent values with the process variables.
We denote by LC the following set of configurations:
We interest now on properties of configurations of LC.
Lemma 9 Any configuration of LC is 0-legitimate and 0-stable.
Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC. By definition of spec, it is obvious that ρ is 0-legitimate. Note that no correct process is enabled by ss-ST in ρ. Consequently, no actions of ss-ST can be executed and we can deduce that ρ is 0-stable.
We can observe that there exists some 0-legitimate configurations which not belong to LC (for example the one of Figure 5 ).
Lemma 10 Given at most n − 1 Byzantine processes, for any initial configuration ρ 0 and any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . starting from ρ 0 , there exists a configuration ρ i such that ρ i ∈ LC.
Proof First, note that if all the correct processes are disabled in a configuration ρ, then ρ belongs to LC. Thus, it is sufficient to show that ss-ST eventually reaches a configuration ρ i in any execution (starting from any configuration) such that all the correct processes are disabled in ρ i .
By contradiction, assume that there exists a correct process that is enabled infinitely often. Notice that once the root process r is activated, r becomes and remains disabled forever. From the assumption that all the correct processes form a connected subsystem, there exists two neighboring correct processes u and v such that u becomes and remains disabled and v is enabled infinitely often. Consider execution after u becomes and remains disabled. Since the daemon is weakly fair, v executes its action infinitely often. Then, eventually v designates u as its parent. It follows that v never becomes enabled again unless u changes level u . Since u never becomes enabled, this leads to the contradiction. Proof Let ρ 0 be a configuration of LC and e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . be an execution starting from ρ 0 . First, we show that any 0-correct process takes at most ∆ d actions in e, where d is the diameter of the subsystem consisting of all the correct processes.
Let F be the set of Byzantine processes in e. Consider a subsystem S ′ consisting of all the correct processes:
We prove by induction on the distance δ from the root in S ′ that process v δ hops away from r in S ′ executes its action at most ∆ δ − 1 times in e.
• Induction basis (δ = 1):
Let v be any process neighboring to the root r. Since ρ 0 is a legitimate configuration, prnt r = 0 and level r = 0 hold at ρ 0 and remain unchanged in e. Thus, if prnt v = r and level v = 1 hold in a configuration σ, then v never changes prnt v or level v in any execution starting from σ. Since prnt v = r and level v = 1 hold within the first ∆ v − 1 actions of v, v can execute its action at most ∆ − 1 times.
• Induction step (with induction assumption): Let v be any process δ hops away from the root r in S ′ , and u be a neighbor of v that is δ − 1 hops away from r in S ′ . From the induction assumption, u can execute its action at most ∆ δ−1 − 1 times.
Process v executes prnt v = u in the first ∆ − 1 actions of v, and v executes prnt v = u every ∆ actions of v. Once prnt v = u holds, v never changes prnt v unless u changes level u (and prnt u ). Thus, v can execute its action at most (∆ − 1) + ∆ × (∆ δ−1 − 1) = ∆ δ − 1 times.
Consequently, any 0-correct process takes at most ∆ d actions in e. As a 0-disruption can be caused only by an action of a Byzantine process from a legitimate configuration, we can bound the number of 0-disruptions by counting the total number of times that correct processes are deceived of neighboring Byzantine processes (i.e. a correct process takes an action due to the (incoherent) state of a neighboring Byzantine process).
If a 0-correct v is deceived by a Byzantine neighbor b, it takes necessarily ∆ v actions before being deceiving again by b (remind that we use a round-robin policy for prnt v ). As any 0-correct process v takes at most ∆ d actions in e, v can be deceived by a given Byzantine neighbor at most ∆ d−1 times. A Byzantine process can have at most ∆ neighboring correct processes and thus can deceive correct processes at most ∆ × ∆ d−1 = ∆ d times. We have at most f Byzantine processes, so the total number of times that correct processes are deceived by neighboring Byzantine processes is f ∆ d . Hence, the number of 0-disruption in e is bounded by f ∆ D . It remains to show that any 0-disruption have a finite length to prove the result.
By contradiction, assume that there exists an infinite 0-disruption d = ρ i , . . . in e. This implies that for all j ≥ i, ρ j is not in LC, which contradicts Lemma 10. Then, the result is proved. Proof From Lemmas 9 and 11, it is sufficient to show that ss-ST eventually reaches a configuration in LC. Lemma 10 allows us to conclude. Proof By the construction of the algorithm, any correct process v which has a correct neighbor u takes at most ∆ steps between two actions of u.
Time complexities
Given two processes u and v, we denote by d ′ (u, v) the distance between u and v in the subgraph of correct processes of S. We are going to prove the following property by induction on i > 0: • Induction basis (i = 1): Let v be a correct neighbor of the root r. By the algorithm, we know that the root r takes at most one step (because r is correct). By the previous remark, we know that v takes at most ∆ steps before and after the action of r. Consequently, v takes at most 2∆ steps in any execution starting from any configuration.
• Induction step (i > 1 with induction assumption): Let v be a correct process such that d ′ (v, r) = i. Denote by u one neighbor of v such that d ′ (u, r) = i − 1 (this process exists by the assumption that the subgraph of correct processes of S is connected).
By the previous remark, we know that v takes at most ∆ steps before the first action of u, between two actions of u and after the last action of u. By induction assumption, we know that u takes at most 2 * Since there is (n − f ) correct processes and any correct process satisfies d ′ (v, r) < d, we can deduce that the system reach a legitimate configuration in at most O((n − f )∆ d ) steps of correct processes. As a round counts at least one step of a correct process, we obtain the result.
Concluding remarks
We introduced the notion of strong stabilization, a property that permits self-stabilizing protocols to contain Byzantine behaviors for tasks where strict stabilization is impossible. An interesting tradeoff appears when considering resilience to Byzantine actions: the more actually Byzantine actions are performed, the faster the stabilization of our protocols is. Our work raises several important open questions:
1. is there a trade-off between the number of perturbations Byzantine nodes can cause and the containment radius ?
2. is there a trade-off between the total number of perturbations Byzantine nodes can cause and the number of Byzantine nodes, that is, is a single Byzantine node more effective to harm the system than a team of Byzantine nodes, considering the same total number of Byzantine actions ?
